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THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDIAN TREATIES,
AGREEMENTS, AND STATUTES
Craig A. Decker*
It is often stated that Indian treaties, agreements, and statutes are
to be liberally construed in favor of the Indians. Those on the In-
dian side of the cases embrace the tenet enthusiastically and
vigorously urge its universal application. Those on the other side
exude less enthusiasm and maintain that the tenet has but limited
application. Basically this paper will attempt to show that the con-
structions applicable to bilaterally arranged Indian treaties and
agreements should not control the constructions applied to
unilaterally enacted statutes, especially statutes permitting Indian
suits against the United States.'
Indian Treaties
The liberal construction doctrine, as discussed here, appears to
have surfaced about 145 years ago in Worcester v. Georgia:
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never
be construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of
which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than their
plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they
should be considered as used only in the latter sense ....
The doctrine was reaffirmed and its underpinning rationale ex-
panded in Jones v. Meehan:
In construing any treaty between the United States and an In-
dian tribe, it must always.. be borne in mind that the
negotiations for the treaty are conducted, on the part of the
United States... by representatives skilled in diplomacy,
masters of a written language,. . . and assisted by an inter-
preter employed by themselves; ... that the Indians, on the
other hand, are a weak and dependent people who.., are
wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of legal expression, and
whose only knowledge of the terms in which the treaty is
framed is that imparted to them by the interpreter employed
by the United States ....
*Assistant Chief, Indian Claims Section, Land and Natural Resources Division,
United States Department of Justice. B.S., 1947, Brigham Young University; LL.B., 1950,
University of Utah. Member of Utah and District of Columbia Bars.
The views expressed are solely those of the author and may not, at times, coincide
with those of the Department of Justice. However, the author normally concurs in the
limited application of the tenet of liberal construction on the side of the Indians.
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And the Court concluded that "the treaty must therefore be con-
strued, not according to the technical meaning of its words to
learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians... . "" The Jones rationale provides
compelling grounds for the application of a liberal construction in
favor of disadvantaged Indians lacking understanding of both the
English language and the English-American law.' The ruling thus
was a good one and it appears that the liberal construction doc-
trine and its rationale, as developed in Worcester and Jones, have
been repeatedly reflected in the Court's opinions down through
the years.6 But, as with most court rulings, subsequent decisions
have tended to limit, to refine, and indeed, sometimes to confuse
the rule as it was originally intended and enunciated. Here, one of
the first major limitations of the liberal construction rule appears
in United States v. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations,7 a case involv-
ing the status of the so-called Leased District situated between the
Canadian and Red rivers in what is now the state of Oklahoma.
After a careful review of the case, the Court of Claims, on its
-weighing of the equities and on the liberal construction doctrine as
developed in Worcester and Jones, concluded that title in the sub-
ject lands had been retained by the Choctaws and Chickasaws and
that the United States had breached its fiduciary duties to the
tribes with respect to those lands.' However, on appeal to the
Supreme Court, the case was reversed, with the Court stating:
But in no case has it been adjudged that the courts could by
mere interpretation or in deference to its view as to what was
right under all the circumstances, incorporate into an Indian
treaty something that was inconsistent with the clear import
of its words. It has never been held that the obvious, palpable
meaning of the words of an Indian treaty may be
disregarded .... 9
Continuing, the Court pointed out that authority over Indian
treaties, as other treaties, rested primarily in the political branches
of our government, and the Court, quoting with approval from a
prior case involving a non-Indian treaty, then stated: "We are to
find out the intention of the parties by just rules of
interpretation .... We are not at liberty to dispense with any of
the conditions or requirements of the treaty, or to take away any
qualification or integral part of any stipulation... "0 These
statements were in line with the Court's earlier statement that "If
the words [of an Indian treaty] be clear and explicit, leaving no
room to doubt what the parties intended, they must be interpreted
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according to their natural and ordinary significance .... "" The
above-noted limitations on liberal construction, enunciated in
Choctaw & Chickasaw, has been followed through the years and
reflects the law as it is today.' For example, in Confederated
Salish v. United States, the Court of Claims stated:
In fact, although plaintiff refers to "resolving an ambigui-
ty," it would appear that plaintiff is really seeking to have us
set aside the wording of the treaty and substitute in its place a
substantially different description. This we are unwilling to
do .... Our task in the present case is to construe the
language of the treaty, not to rewrite it .... 13
And even under the generous jurisdictional grants of the Indian
Claims Commission Act, 4 which permits recovery as though the
Indian treaties and agreements were revised in certain situations, 5
the Court of Claims has refused to permit constructions that
would in effect be a rewriting of the terms of the treaties or
agreements. 6
Indian Agreements
During.the eighteenth century and through nearly three-fourths
of the nineteenth century, treaties were the customary vehicle by
which the United States entered into agreements with the various
Indian tribes." However, by reason of the decrease in tribal
sovereignty, and by the fact that the House of Representatives felt
it should be involved in Indian compacts, the procedure was
changed. 8 Thus, in an appropriation act of 1871, it was provided
that "No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent na-
tion, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract
by treaty.... '"I
After the 1871 Act, instead of treaties, the parties, i.e., a tribe
and the United States, adopted the agreement procedure for enter-
ing into their contracts.2 ° The agreement procedure entailed
negotiations between the tribal representatives and representatives
of the United States very similar to those used in the prior treaty
negotiations.' After the representatives had concluded an accept-
able agreement, it was then submitted to both Houses of Congress
for ratification.' The ratification of the agreement was, insofar as
form was concerned, a statute passed by both Houses of Congress
and signed by the President."
Not surprisingly, with the agreements/statutes being in
substance essentially the same as the prior treaties, these
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agreements/statutes were given the same construction by the
courts as had been given to the Indian treaties that preceded
them.'
In Choate v. Trapp, the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians con-
tended that their land allotments were not subject to state
taxation.Y The question turned on whether the tax provisions of
the Atoka Agreement/statute, previously entered into between
the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes and the United States, and
ratified by Congress, 6 should be strictly construed, as tax exemp-
tions customarily are, or should be liberally construed, as Indian
treaties generally are. The Court, after reviewing the tax exemp-
tion construction precedents, stated:
6. But in the Government's dealings with the Indians the
rule is exactly the contrary. The constuction, instead of being
strict, is liberal; doubtful expressions, instead of being re-
solved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in
favor of a weak and defenseless people, who are wards of the
nation, and dependent wholly upon its protection and good
faith ....7
The Indians prevailed in Choate.
Subsequently, in Carpenter v. Shaw, the Court had occasion to
reaffirm its Choate position, with respect to the Atoka Agree-
ment/statute, stating that, "While in general tax exemptions are
not to be presumed.., the contrary is the rule to be applied to tax
exemptions secured to the Indians by agreement between them
and the national government .... ",29 The Court then quoted
Choate: "Such provisions are to be liberally construed. Doubtful
expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless
people who are wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection
and good faith ...." And, after also quoting from Worcester and
Jones, the Court ruled in favor of the Indians.
This writer has no quarrel with the liberal construction doc-
trines as developed in Worcester, Jones, Choctaw & Chickasaw,
Choate, and Carpenter and believes the same represent sound
law."
The Statutes
Treaties and agreements/statutes are bilateral dealings and, as
can be seen above, the courts try fairly to arrive at the intent of the
parties to the dealings. Statutes as such, on the other hand, are
unilateral acts of the United States and the inquiry should be
directed singly to the intent of Congress. It is believed, however,
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that there has been a tendency in some instances not to distinguish
between the bilateral agreements, where there are, on occasion,
compelling reasons to construe liberally in favor of an Indian in-
tent, from the situations in unilaterally enacted statutes where the
Indian intent is irrelevant. The confusion has arisen, at least to
some extent, both with respect to statutes not involving a waiver
of sovereign immunity as well as statutes permitting suits against
the United States.
Statutes Not Involving a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
The first major confusion of the bilateral rule with unilateral cir-
cumstances appears to be Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States." There the Court analyzed the issue before it in these
words: "The question is one of construction,-of determining
what Congress intended by the words 'the body of lands known as
Annette islands."' So far, so good. This was solid rationale and in
its following opinion the Court concluded that Congress intended
that the Annette Island Reservation was to include the adjacent
waters. But, thereafter the Court stated 2 : "This conclusion has
support in the general rule that statutes passed for the benefit of
dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be liberally con-
strued, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the In-
dians. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665,675 .. "-
As noted above, the Choate case was speaking solely of a
bilateral agreement where it was eminently appropriate to liberal-
ly construe the doubtful expressions as the disadvantaged Indians
actually understood them. However, in Alaska the Indian
understanding was irrelevant; the inquiry should have been
restricted solely to the unilateral intent of Congress.m
Nonetheless, the Alaska application of the Choate bilateral rule
(oranges) to unilateral Indian legislation (bananas) continued.' In
United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad36 a case wherein the
railroad company maintained that the aboriginal interest of the In-
dians had been extinguished by certain acts of Congress, the Court
held:
As stated in Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675, the rule of
construction recognized without exception for over a century
has been that "doubtful expressions, instead of being re-
solved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in
favor of a weak and defenseless people, who are wards of the
nations, and dependent wholly upon its protection and good
faith ....
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In its more recent decisions, while not expressly rejecting the ra-
tionales of Alaska and Santa Fe, the Court appears to have in
mind the logical distinction existing between the bilateral dealings
and the unilateral statutes. Thus, in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Commission," relying in part on the liberal treaty construction
doctrine and in part on the doctrine of quasi-sovereign immunity
of tribes, the Court concluded that a Navajo Indian living and
working on the reservation was not subject to state income tax.
Significantly, however, the liberal treaty construction reliance
was not enunciated with respect to a unilateral statute, as had
been the case in Alaska and Santa Fe, but rather was restricted in
application to the 1868 Navajo Treaty." The Court, after noting
the disadvantage of the Navajo Indians in entering into that trea-
ty, stated:
It is circumstances such as these which have led this Court in
interpreting Indian treaties, to adopt the general rule that
"[dloubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the
weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation,
dependent upon its protection and good faith." Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) ......
Significant also in McClanahan, the Court restricted its examina-
tion of the unilateral statutes, relevant to the case, to determining
the intent of Congress."
In the 1977 Rosebud Sioux case, 2 it was argued that liberal con-
struction should be applied to certain unilateral statutes of Con-
gress respecting Indian reservation areas, the Court noting," [W]e
are cautioned to follow the general rule that [d]oubtful expressions
are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who
are wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good
faith .... , The Court, however, went on to point out:
But the "general rule" does not command a determination
that reservation status survives in the face of congressionally
manifested intent to the contrary .... In all cases, "the face of
the Act," the "surrounding circumstances," and the
"legislative history," are to be examined with an eye towards
determining what congressional intent was ......
And based on its review of the unilateral intent of Congress, the
Court concluded against the Indians' contentions.'
With the proper distinction drawn between the constructions of
bilateral agreements and treaties and the unilateral statutes made
in McClanahan and Rosebud Sioux,' 6 it may be that the illogical
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applications of Alaska and Santa Fe, and the arguments based
thereon, will have been put to rest. 7
Statutes Permitting Indian Suits Against the United States
While, as noted above, unilateral statutes may or may not be
appropriately liberally construed in favor of the Indians, depend-
ing upon the particular statute, it is submitted that there is one
type of unilateral statute which calls for strict construction. This is
the statute which waives the sovereign immunity of the United
States and permits the Indians to sue the national government.48
Because the statutes waiving sovereign immunity to suit are as
applicable to non-Indians as to Indians, many of the governing
decisions in the field involve non-Indian plaintiffs. These include
Schillinger v. United States, where the rule of construction was
stated thus:
The United States cannot be sued in their courts without
their consent, and in granting such consent Congress has an
absolute discretion to specify the cases and the contingencies
in which the liability of the government is submitted to the
courts for judicial determination. Beyond the letter of such
consent, the courts may not go, no matter how beneficial
they may deem or in fact might be their possession of a larger
jurisdiction over the liabilities of the government.
United States v. Sherwood used these words: "The section must
be interpreted in the light of its function in giving consent of the
Government to be sued, which consent, since it is a relinquish-
ment of a sovereign immunity, must be strictly interpreted.... "'
And Soriano v. United States voiced the rule in this fashion:
"[Tihis Court has long decided that limitations and conditions
upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly
observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.... "' Con-
sistently, the same strict construction rule has been applied to
statutes waiving sovereign immunity with respect to Indian claims
against the United States. In Klamath Indians v. United States,
where the sovereign immunity of the United States had been
waived in favor of the Klamath Indian Tribe, the Court enun-
ciated: "The Act grants a special privilege to plaintiffs and it is to
be strictly construed and may not by implication be extended to
cases not plainly within its terms .... ,,Z In Blackfeather v. United
States, the Court stated the rule in this manner: "As these statutes
extend the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and permit the
Government to be sued for causes of action therein referred to, the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1977
grant of jurisdiction must be shown clearly to cover the case
before us, and if it does not, it will not be implied.... "" In Sioux
Tribe v. United States,; the rule was phrased by the Court of
Claims thus: "Suit may not be maintained against the United
States in any case on a claim not clearly within the terms of the
statute by which it consents to be sued .... Special jurisdictional
acts are strictly construed and clear grant of authority must be
found in the act .... "
Despite the above clear-cut expressions that statutes permitting
suits against the United States must be strictly construed, and that
the same are applicable to Indians as well as non-Indians,
arguments are sometimes advanced that such statutes should be
liberally construed on behalf of the Indians. These surface fre-
quently with respect to the litigation arising under the Indian
Claims Commission Act and usually maintain that this Act
represents broad, remedial legislation and on this basis is entitled
to liberal construction. However, nearly all statutes waiving
sovereign immunity serve a remedial purpose. Notwithstanding
this, as seen in the cases cited above, the traditional rule of strict
construction is applied to such statutes.- Moreover, with respect
to the argument that the Indian Claims Commission Act 7
represents broad and general legislation, note these words of the
Court of Claims from Assiniboine Tribe v. United States: "The In-
dian Claims Commission Act of August 13, 1946, is special legisla-
tion for the benefit of a particular class, just as jurisdictional acts
waiving the statute of limitation, etc., and permitting suits had
been in the past .... "s The Court then cited strict construction
precedents as governing.'
As might also be expected, those urging liberal construction cite
in support of their arguments the Choate, Alaska, and Santa Fe
cases.60 But as noted above, these three cases do not properly pro-
vide support. Choate involved a bilateral agreement and Alaska
and Santa Fe, while involving unilaterally enacted statutes, ap-
pear to have erroneously applied the bilateral rationale to
unilateral situations.6' Quite aside from the above objections, it
also should be noted that the Choate, Alaska, and Santa Fe cases
were not suits against the United States. To the contrary, the
United States was on the side of the Indians in all three cases.
Plainly, these cases cannot serve as precedents for the proposition
that statutes waiving sovereign immunity and permitting Indian
suits against the United States are to be accorded liberal construc-
tion.
In addition to the above three cases, those who would overturn
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the strict construction rule in Indian suits against the United States
cite Otoe,2 Yankton Sioux,' and Snoqualmie," three cases decid-
ed by the Court of Claims under the provisions of the Indian
Claims Commission Act. In Otoe, the court did pose the question
of strict versus liberal construction of the Indian Claims Commis-
sion Act, and while citing Choate, Alaska, and Santa Fe, supra,
never did decide the construction issue.' In Yankton Sioux" and
Snoqualmie67 the court applied liberal constructions, but these
were limited to what the court considered to be pleading questions
on which it concluded the modern rules of liberal pleading should
govern. None of these decisions provide a challenge to the basic
rule that Indian statutes waiving the sovereign immunity of the
United States must be strictly construed.
More representative of the Court of Claims position, with
respect to statutes waiving sovereign immunity, is its recent en
banc Mescalero decision.6 There the trial tribunal, the Indian
Claims Commission, had allowed compound interest on the In-
dian judgment, but on appeal the Court of Claims reversed,
pointing out that "[1it is fundamental that the Government has
sovereign immunity from suit except where Congress has by
legislation expressly waived such immunity. This principle applies
to claims for interest against the United States .... "69 The court
noted that "[miany cases have held that the waiver of sovereign
immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed .... "" Among the cases thereafter quoted in support of
the position was this statement: "It is beyond argument the United
States may be sued only where its immunity has been specifically
waived by statute, and that such waiver may not be implied in the
construction of an ambiguous statute... ,"' and: "jurisdiction to
grant relief depends wholly upon the extent to which the United
States has waived its sovereign immunity to suit and that such a
waiver cannot be implied but must be unequivocally ex-
pressed.... "72
The court then considered at length the many Supreme Court
cases which had insisted on strict construction in the suits involv-
ing the waiver of sovereign immunity as applied to the interest
question, 3 including this quotation from United States v. New
York Rayon Importing Co.': "Thus there can be no consent by
implication or by use of ambiguous language.... The consent
necessary to waive the traditional immunity must be express, and
it must be strictly construed....."' The court went on to reverse
the Commission, concluding that no interest, compound or even
simple, was permissible.6
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For the above reasons, it is submitted that in Indian suits against
the United States under a statute waiving sovereign immunity, the
rule has always been and still is that the statute must be strictly
construed against the Indians.
Conclusions
1. In construing bilateral Indian agreements (treaties and
agreements) between the United States and the Indian tribes,
courts will seek to arrive at what the parties to the agreement
intended.7
2. If the terms of an agreement are clear, the courts will not
:resort to outside factors but will assign the terms of the agreement
their natural meanings and arrive at the parties' intent from the
agreement itself.78
3. If, however, a term of an agreement is ambiguous, the courts
will look to relevant external factors that may aid its construction
in determining the parties' intent. 9
4. In considering external factors, at least if the Indians and their
representatives are disadvantaged in their bargaining position and
in understanding the agreement language and its legal conse-
quences, the courts will utilize a liberal construction in determin-
ing the Indian intent."
5. However, with respect to unilaterally enacted statutes dealing
with Indian matters, the courts will seek to arrive at the intent of
the Congress, the Indian intent being irrelevant.'
6. Some of these unilaterally enacted statutes, in arriving at the
congressional intent, may, under settled statutory construction
guidelines, warrant liberal construction, others may warrant strict
constructions, while still others may warrant neither liberal nor
s;trict constructions but require individualized treatment."
7. However, among those unilaterally enacted Indian statutes
which require strict constructions are those in which the United
States has waived its sovereign immunity to suit and permits an
Indian tribe to sue the sovereign.'
Thus, there is no single mode of construction for all Indian
treaties, agreements, and statutes, and the interpreter of such in-
struments must decide, through a discriminating use of past
precedents, which construction is appropriate in a given situation.
To this end, hopefully, the above-discussed guidelines and demar-
cations may be helpful.
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NOTES
1. Of course, cases are not always won or lost merely by liberal or strict construction.
But in given cases, the utilization of either liberal or strict construction may well tilt the rul-
ing strongly one way or the other and be the deciding factor in the decision ultimately
reached.
2. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
3. 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899).
4. Id.
5. Other reasons, e.g., the guardian and ward relationship, a powerful nation dealing
with a weak and dependent nation, the lack of freedom of choice of the Indians, etc., are
sometimes also assigned as grounds for construing the treaties favorably toward the In-
dians. See also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81
(1905). See generally Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912) and Carpenter v. Shaw, 280
U.S. 363 (1930), discussed infra.
6. E.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194. 199 (1975); Puyallup Tribe v. Depart-
ment of Game, 391 U.S. 392-98 (1968); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116
(1938); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396 (1902).
7. 179 U.S. 494 (1900). See also Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 353
(1945); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
8. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. United States, 34 Ct. Cl. 17, 119-20 (1899),
rev'd, 179 U.S. 494 (1900).
9. 179U.S. at 532.
10. Id. at 533.
11. Id. at 531.
12. Federal Indian Law takes note of this in these words:"Indian treaties, while en-
titled to a certain amount of liberal construction, are to be construed nevertheless according
to their tenor, and their terms are not to be varied by judicial construction in order to avoid
alleged injustices." F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 140 (1958).
13. 173 Ct. Cl. 398, 405 (1965). See also cases cited in note 6, supra.
14. 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1970).
15. Id. § 2 and § 70a, respectively.
16. United States v. Nez Perce Tribe, 194 Ct. Cl. 490 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
872 (1972).
17. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW supra note 12, at 46-66
18. Id. at 66-67.
19. 16 Stat. 566 (1871), 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970).
20. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 12, at 67. See also Antoine v. United States,
420 U.S. 194, 199-204 (1975).
21. Antoine v. United States, 420 U.S. 194 (1975).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. See also the Choate and Carpenter cases discussed infra.
25. 224 U.S. 665, 668-75 (1912).
26. 30 Stat. 505 (1898), as amended, 32 Stat. 657 (1902).
27. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
28. Id. at 679.
29. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363,366-67 (1930).
30. Of course, if the circumstances surrounding a United States-Indian agreement
were to show that the Indians or their representatives knew and understood the terms of the
agreement just as well as the representatives of the United States, and that their bargaining
position was just as good, the basic reasons for liberal construction of such an agreement
would no longer be present. Compare Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127,
140-41 (1904).
31. 248 U.S. 78, 87 (1918).
32. Id. at 89.
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33. As noted above, while Choate did involve a statute insofar as form is concerned,
with respect to substance an agreement was involved. This distinction appears to have been
overlooked in Alaska and also in United States v. Santa Fe Pac. Ry., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
The distinction also appears to have gone unmarked in Otoe & Missouri Tribe v. United
States, 131 Ct. Cl. 593 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955).
34. In fairness to the Court, it appears to have decided Alaska without resort to the
Choate doctrine but merely threw in the latter for good measure. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries
v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 87-89 (1918).
35. In objecting in this part to some of these past applications of the bilateral rationale
to unilateral legislation, this writer does not mean to say that this necessarily rules out a
liberal construction of unilateral Indian legislation. To the contrary, there may be other
grounds, in given situations, warranting liberal construction, and to the extent a unilateral
Indian statute falls within such legislation and is without countervailing reasons for strict
construction, it would appear to be entitled to liberal construction.
36. 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941).
37. Id. at 343-60. Although this portion of Santa Fe appears to have been primarily
concerned with the construction of unilateral statutes, it did have overtones of agreements
between the Indians and the United States. Id. at 347-57. And here again in fairness to the
Court it must be said that the constructions applied to the statutes were secondary to the
main issues considered.
38. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
39. 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
40. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
41. Id. at 176-77.
42. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,-U.S.-, 97 S.Ct. 1361 (1977).
43. Id. at 1363.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1363-77. The dissenting opinion urged liberal construction (id. at 1378-80),
but significantly the Court did not adopt the rationale.
46. Note also that in Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-204 (1974), the Court
points out advisedly that the statute there was one ratifying an Indian agreement and as
such was subject to the same liberal construction accorded to Indian treaties.
47. However, in DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975), the Court
did not refer to the basic distinction between construing an Indian statute and an Indian
treaty. However, the statute there appears to have been one of those subject to liberal con-
struction rather than to strict construction. Compare Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504-
505 (1973).
48. But, even under these statutes, Indian treaties and agreements are accorded their
customary liberal constructions. However, if the claim rests upon construction of the
statute permitting the suit, strict construction governs. The case of Peoria Tribe v. United
States, 390 U.S. 468 (1968),illustrates this dichotomy. At page 470, the Court notes that
strict construction is applicable to the Indian Claims Commission Act as in other statutes
wherein the Unites States waives its sovereign immunity. But the Court went on to con-
clude that the issue there turned, not on the statute, but on the Peoria treaty and proceeded
to accord the treaty liberal construction. Id. at 470-73.
49. 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894).
50. 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941).
51. 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957).
52. 296 U.S. 244, 250 (1935).
53. 190 U.S. 368,376 (1903).
54. 97 Ct. Cl. 613, 664 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 789 (1943).
55. See also Omaha Tribe v. United States, 253 U.S. 275, 281-83 (1920).
56. Compare also McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951): "While, as the
court below pointed out, legislation for the benefit of seamen is to be construed liberally in
their favor, it is equally true that statutes which waive immunity of the United States from
suit are to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign." [Citation omitted.( The Court
ruled in favor of the United States. Id. at 27-28. See to the same effect United States v.
Michel, 282 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1931).
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57. 60 Stat. 1049(1946), 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 et. seq. (1970).
58. 128 Ct. Cl. 617, 631 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 863 (1954).
59. Id. at 631-32.
60. See notes 17-25, supra.
61. Id.
62. Otoe & Missouri Tribe v. United States, 131 Ct. CI. 593, cert. denied, 350 U.S.
848(1955).
63. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 175 Ct. Cl. 564 (1966).
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